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1. Introduction 
Cliteur, Paul, "Fuller's Faith", in: Willem 1. Witteveen 
and Wibren van der Burg, eds., Rediscovering Fuller: 
Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design, 
Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 1999, pp. lOO-12t4. 
What has come to be known as the "Fuller-Hart debate" in legal philoso-
phy refers to a series of intellectual exchanges between Lon Fuller and 
Herbert Hart. Judging 'from the fact that in several anthologies in the 
field of legal philosophy excerpts or integral texts of the debate are in-
cluded/ this debate is considered to be important to modern legal philo-
sophical thought, and rightly so. It started with "Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals" by Hart. 2 Fuller's answer was "Positivism 
and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart."3 
In most books on legal philosophy the discussion between Hart and 
Fuller is presented as a debate on the "separation of law and morals," but 
the discussion is much richer than this. It has to do with interpretation, 
with the ideals of legal scholarship, and much more. 
It has been a debate that seems to have stimulated both writers to 
further develop their theories. Both Hart and Fuller wrote substantial 
treatises on legal philosophy. Hart wrote The Concept of Law (1961)/ 
Fuller The Morality of Law (1964).5 In The Morality of Law, Fuller reacted 
to The Concept of Law, and in 1965 Hart reacted to Fuller's criticism in a 
* I want to thank Kenneth Winston and Willem Witteveen for their valuable comments 
on an earlier draft of this article. 
1 Cf. Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross, eds., Philosophy of Law, 4th ed. (Belmont, Calif.: 
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991), pp. 63-103. 
2 H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," Harvard Law Review 
71 (1958): 593-629; also in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 49-87. 
3 Lon L. Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart," Harvard 
Law Review 71 (1958): 630-72 (hereafter referred to as PFL); also in Feinberg and 
Gross, eds., Philosophy of Law, pp. 82-102. 
4 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
5 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1969; hereafter referred to as ML). 
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review of Fuller's work. 6 In a revised edition of The Morality of Law, 
Fuller countered Hart's arguments. 
2. Two points of agreement 
2.1 Both Fuller and Hart subscribed to "hypothetical natural law" 
Many scholars have underlined the differences between Hart and Fuller, 
but there are some striking points of agreement as well. Both Hart and 
Fuller protest against classical natural-law thinking and develop what 
might be called "hypothetical natural law.,,7 Their conception of natural 
law is based on the presumption that people wish to survive. 8 Hart is 
concerned with the survival of society, Fuller with the survival of the legal 
system. These are indeed different foci. But, all the same, the points of 
agreement, so it seems to me, are more striking than their differences. 
Both reject "classical natural law" thinking. Hart defines this as 
follows: "that there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting 
discovery by human reason, with which man-made law must conform to be 
valid."g Hart continues in criticizing several forms this classical natural-
law doctrine has taken, especially as it has been connected with a teleolog-
ical conception of nature. Hart thinks this conception is to be rejected, 
although he contends that there is a grain of truth in it. This is "the tacit 
assumption that the proper end of human activity is survival, and this 
rests on the simple contingent fact that most men most of the time wish to 
6 H.L.A. Hart, "Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law," Harvard Law Review 78 (1965): 
1281-96; also in Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 343-65. 
7 ef. for Hart's treatment of natural law: Hart, Concept of Law, pp. 181·95, and for 
Fuller, ML, p. 96: ''What I have tried to do is to discern and articulate the natural laws 
of a particular kind of human undertaking, which I have described as 'the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.' These natural laws have nothing 
to do with any 'brooding omnipresence in the skies.' Nor have they the slightest affinity 
with any such proposition as that the practice of contraception is a violation of God's 
law .... They are like the natural laws of carpentry." The most important predecessor, 
if not founding father, of the hypothetical approach is Kant. ef. Jeremy Waldron, "Why 
Law - Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?," Law and Philosophy 13 (1994): 259-84, at p. 259: 
"The internal morality argument would be a way of establishing what Kant called a 
hypothetical imperative." 
8 My emphasis on the "hypothetical" character of both Hart and Fuller's natural-law 
conceptions does not exclude, of course, that there are other similarities. Both, for 
instance, are examples of a "secular" natural-law conception. ef. Kenneth Winston, 
"Introduction," Law and Philosophy 13 (1994): 253-58. 
9 Hart, Concept of Law, p. 182. 
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continue in survival."lo Taking human survival as an absolute norm would 
mean to subscribe to the traditional natural-law position. But what we 
could do is take this aim of human survival as a hypothesis. And reflecting 
on human nature and the nature of reality we could, given survival as an 
aim, detect even a "minimum content of natural law." 
The nature of man and reality points to five "truisms": (i) human 
vulnerability; (ii) approximate equality; (iii) limited altruism; (iv) limited 
resources; (v) limited understanding and strength of will. In each case 
these facts afford a reason why, given survival as an aim, law and morals 
should include a specific content. For instance, the norm "Thou shalt not 
kill" is understandable under the presuppositions of (a) the aim of human 
survival and (b) human vulnerability. Hart writes: "The general form of 
the argument is simply that without such a content laws and morals could 
not forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associat-
ing with each other."ll 
There are differences with Fuller's approach as developed in The 
Morality of Law, of course. Fuller is not concerned with norms like "Thou 
shalt not kill." These are examples of "substantial aims" of the law, and it 
may be claimed that Hart's approach to natural law is, in a sense, more 
ambitious than Fuller's, who only claims to have found some "lower 
laws"12 or "procedurallaws,,,13 as distinguished from a substantive natural 
law. But there are several points of agreement; especially the "hypotheti-
cal approach" to the problems of natural law that Hart and Fuller share is 
striking. Hart is concerned with delineating the moral norms that make 
society viable, Fuller is concerned with the norms that make a legal system 
viable. Paraphrasing Hart's idea of classical natural law, we could typifY 
Fuller's ambition as the quest for "certain principles of law, awaiting 
discovery by human reason, with which man-made law must conform to 
remain valid."14 
2.2 Fuller and Hart were no "rights thinkers" 
There is another interesting feature of Fuller's thought that made him 
10 Hart, Concept of Law, p. 187. 
11 Hart, Concept of Law, p. 189. 
12 ML, p. 96: "They are not 'higher' laws; if any metaphor of elevation is appropriate they 
should be called 'lower' laws." 
13 ML, p. 96: "As a convenient (though not wholly satisfactory) way of describing the 
distinction being taken we may speak of a procedural, as distinguished from a substan-
tive natural law." 
14 Hart, Concept of Law, p. 182 (emphasis added). 
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more of a companion to Hart's positivist approach than a critic. Neither 
Fuller nor Hart was a "rights thinker."15 This explains why in the 1960s, 
when political demands were more and more formulated in the vocabulary 
of "rights," their approach no longer seemed in tune with modern develop-
ments. In this period, civil rights for people discriminated against because 
of their skin color, equal rights for women, and other political ideals were 
formulated. In this period Ronald Dworkin came to the fore. 16 His Taking 
Rights Seriously (1978) was the intellectual underpinning of these social 
developments. Dworkin - commenting on Rawls's work - assents to the 
proposition that justice as fairness rests on the assumption of a natural 
right of all men and women to equality of concern and respect, a right they 
possess not by virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but 
"simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give jus-
tice."17 According to Dworkin rights are "trumps," which will prevail over 
official acts done in pursuance of some policy, judged to be conducive to 
some desirable public goal. 
This sounds like natural-law thinking, and Dworkin does not seem very 
allergic to that. IS Yet he clearly writes that rights are no gift of God, but 
15 Cf. Winston, "Introduction," p. 254: Winston contends that Fuller saw freedom (not 
justice) as the inherent general aim of the law. Fuller wrote extensively on freedom. 
Most of his writings are unpublished lectures and fragments of essays. His most well-
known essay is "Freedom - A Suggested Analysis," Harvmd Law Review 68 (1955): 
1302-25. Cf. about the relation between freedom and law also: Kenneth 1. Winston, 
"Toward a Liberal Conception of Legislation," in Liberal Democracy: Nomos XXI, ed. 
J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (New YorkILondon: New York University Press, 1983), 
pp. 313-42. Hart wrote "Are There Any Natural Rights?," in Theories of Rights, ed. 
Jeremy Waldron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 77-91, but this essay is 
not included in any of his collections of essays. 
16 Cf. for these developments: J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 426. All the same, there are many Fullerian ideas in Dwor-
kin's work, cf. Luban in this volume. For instance, the comparison Fuller makes 
between telling a joke and developing law (Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself, 
New York: AMS Press, [1940] 1978, p. 8) or, even better, his comparison between law 
and executing the pencil sketch of an invention (ML, p.85), is similar to Dworkin's idea 
of the chain novel (Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire, Cambridge, Mass.ILondon: Belknap 
Press, 1986, p. 228). Cf. N.E. Simmonds, "Philosophy of Law," in The Blackwell 
Companion to Philosophy, ed. Nicholas Bunnin and E.P.- Tsui-James (Oxford: Black-
well, 1996), pp. 388-414, at p. 409: "Fuller's work seems to have influenced Dworkin in 
several fundamental respects, although the influence is not acknowledged." 
17 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1978), p. 426. 
18 Cf. Ronald A. Dworkin, '''Natural' Law Revisited," University of Florida Law Review 34 
(1982): 165-88; also in Philosophical Problems of the Law, 2d ed., ed. David M. Adams 
(Belmont, Calif. [etc.]: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996), pp. 93-99. 
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are entailed by the primordial right to equality. No divine natural law, but 
a kind of natural law after all. What distinguishes Dworkin from Fuller 
and Hart in this respect, is the absolutist timbre. Dworkin's "natural law" 
is not the hypothetical natural law which both Hart and Fuller subscribed 
to,19 but an a priori, a "self-evident truth" in the sense of American 
natural-law thinking. 
3. Three points of difference 
3.1 Do the eight principles contain a "morality of law"? 
So what are the differences between Hart and Fuller? The first point of 
controversy is prima facie a point of semantics. Hart refuses to call the 
"eight principles" a "morality of law." His most vocal protest on this point 
is found in his review of Fuller's The Morality of Law. 20 Hart states that 
the principles that make law possible are characterized by Fuller as "the 
inner morality of law," "the special morality of law," "the morality that 
makes law possible," "procedural natural law," and "the principles of 
legality." Hart is critical toward all these labels, except the last one. He 
adopts the last one as, what he thinks, the "most conventional designa-
tion." The classification of the eight principles as a form of morality 
"breeds confusion.,,21 What the eight principles are, is a set of "principles of 
good craftsmanship." Fuller confuses two notions "that it is vital to hold 
apart": the notions of purposive activity and morality. And then Hart 
presents his hilarious analogy that inspired so many followers to reject 
Fuller's semantics as absurd: "Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, 
and reflections on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles . 
. . . But to call these principles of the poisoner's art 'the morality of poison-
ing' would simply blur the distinction between the notion of efficiency for a 
purpose and those final judgments about activities and purposes with 
which morality in its various forms is concerned.,,22 
19 Although Hart is not a "happy natural lawyer." He was certainly not "in love" with the 
minimum content of natural law he felt that he had to adopt, as Fuller was "in love" 
with the purposive conception of law that he developed in all his writings. Cf. Hart in 
"Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law," p. 363: "The author has all his life been in love 
with the notion of purpose and this passion, or any other, can both inspire and blind a 
man." 
20 Hart, "Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law," pp. 343-65. 
21 Hart, "Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law," p. 347. 
22 Hart, "Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law," p. 350. 
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A majority of commentators have followed Hart in this criticism, 
presenting countless variants to Hart's example of poisoning. Martin 
Golding speaks of "golf' and "safecracking.,,23 Fuller's use involves an 
overextension of the term "morality," he says. "It would seem strange to 
call the conditions for good golf-playing the 'inner morality of golf or the 
conditions for excellence in safecracking (a recognized profession) an 
'internal morality.' Not all kinds of excellence are moral, so not all matters 
of aspiration involve a 'morality of aspiration.'" Brian Bix objects to the 
use of the word "morality" as well: "Unlike traditional natural-law theo-
rists . . . the test Fuller applies is one of function and procedure rather 
than strictly one of moral content.,,24 And Wacks contends that Fuller "has 
not made clear" how his eight principles are "moral.,,25 
Apart from the group of thinkers who censure Fuller for his semantic 
extravagances, there is also the group that belittles the significance of the 
question whether we call the eight principles "moral" or rather "effica-
cious.,,26 ' 
Perhaps there is more at stake than mere semantics; but this will be 
exemplified during the course of my argument. Let us first have a look at 
what is defended by Fuller's critics. They insist on naming the eight 
principles "principles of efficient lawmaking." Again, it is Hart who took 
the lead here. We should not blur the distinction between the notion of 
efficiency for a purpose and those final judgments about activities and 
purposes with which morality in its various forms is concerned, Hart 
writes. 27 
I do not agree. I think Nigel Simmonds makes a point in asserting that 
there is something question-begging in the description of the eight princi-
ples as principles of effective lawmaking. "If Hart had said that they were 
principles of effective social control, there would have been obvious objec-
23 Martin P. Golding, Philosophy of Law (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975), pp. 
49-50. 
24 Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), p. 82. 
25 Raymond Wacks, Jurisprudence, 2d ed. (London: Blackstone Press, [1987] 1990), p. 73. 
Cf. also James Herget, American Jurisprudence, 1870·1970 (Houston, Tex.: Rice 
University Press, 1990), p. 258, who thinks that "whether or not his canons of law-
making should be called a morality is itself open to question." 
26 Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, Mass.!London: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), pp. 229-330, is critical on the Fuller-Hart debate. Rereading 
the debate he was "struck by how little was at stake." He castigates Fuller's faith in 
"persuasive definition" and - in the words of Shklar - his attempt to "condemn unjust 
decisions to grammatical death through definitional execution." 
27 Hart, "Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law," p. 350. 
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tions to his claim. If social control is merely a matter of preventing wide-
spread violence and revolutionary dissent, it is unlikely that Fuller's eight 
principles will be a good guide to the most effective techniques."28 A 
regime of terror where officials act unpredictably or on the basis of secret 
directives is much more likely to succeed in quelling opposition, Simmonds 
writes.29 
Thus presented, the statement that the principles of legality are merely 
principles of efficacy, immediately leads us to the question: efficacious for 
what? The eight principles will not be a good guide to the effective tech-
niques of mass coercion, Simmonds writes. Therefore, the question re-
mains what law is and how it differs from organized coercion.30 "Law is 
the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules," 
Fuller wrote.31 This view treats law as an activity and regards a legal 
system as the product of a sustained purposive effort, Fuller tells us. Two 
elements are central to this "definition."32 First, the object ofthe definition 
is something we consider good. For obvious reasons we consider human 
conduct subjected to rules to be better than utterly capricious and arbi-
trary conduct. Second, law is seen as something purposive. These two 
elements explain that the conditions that have to be fulfilled to make law 
possible can be regarded as something good, or conducive to something 
good, and even as a morality. This "morality" does not have to be the 
"morality" in the sense of a personal feeling of justice, the critical function 
we hold back to judge everything we ourselves do and other people do. So 
Hart and other legal positivists do not have to fear we neglect our critical 
faculties. Nonetheless, there is reason enough to call the principles of 
legality a "morality oflaw." 
What about the claim that designating the principles of legality as a 
28 N.E. Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law and Rights (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986), p. 119. 
29 Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence, p. 119. Cf. also John Finnis, Natural Law 
and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 274, contending the same: 
"Adherence to the Rule of Law ... is always liable to reduce the efficiency for evil and 
an evil government, since it systematically restricts the government's freedom of 
manoeuvre." 
30 Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence, p. 120. 
31 ML, p. 106. 
32 Winston denies Fuller ever had the ambition to present something of a "definition" of 
law. Cf. Kenneth 1. Winston, "Introduction," in Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social 
Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, ed. Kenneth 1. Winston (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1981), pp. 11-44, at p. 30: "lIlt is clear that such a characterization is 
meant to define not law in general but only the process of legislation." This may be 
right. I use the word "definition" here in a rather loose sense. 
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morality would commit us to the view that there must be a "morality of 
poisoning" as well? I believe this argument simply overlooks the difference 
between two kinds of activities people can engage in: good and evil activi-
ties. The principles conducive to good activities can, without strain of 
language, be called "a morality," and the principles conducive to evil 
activities can be called "efficacious," thereby making clear that the goal 
they are conducive to is not something good or at least neutral. Because 
loving is a good activity there is a "morality of loving." This morality 
comprises principles such as: never be egocentric, always be caring, try 
not to be moody, show care for the person you love, never squabble about 
money, etc. It would be a bit silly to protest to the use of the word "moral-
ity" in this context, because the principles presented are merely a matter 
of "efficiency." "For better or for worse" is not a principle of efficiency, it is 
a moral principle. Why? Because marriage is not a matter of efficiency. 
And because torturing people is not a good deed but an evil one, there 
can be no "morality of torture," although it may be possible to enumerate 
the rules and principles that maximize the pain for the victim. Of course, 
there are many instances where we hesitate whether to speak of "princi-
ples of efficiency" or "the morality" of a certain activity. Gardening seems 
an example of this. A "monility of gardening" sounds bizarre, although it 
is imaginable that in a certain context, e.g. when we would want to 
emphasize that certain activities have to be avoided, we could present 
them as "absolutely violating the morality of gardening." 
When all this seems convincing, it is not only clear why Fullerians, and 
other natural-law thinkers, have no qualms about using the word "moral-
ity" in relation to law, but also why legal positivists wish to avoid that. 
Positivists do not think that law is something to be valued in itself - law 
can be good or bad. It all depends on the content of the laws. For the 
Fullerian, law is always better than no-law, because human conduct that 
is subjected to rules is better than human conduct that is "lawless."33 
So far, the first point of difference. I do not think that the words 
"morality oflaw" involve an overextension of the word "morality." 
3.2 What is the relation between legality andjustice? 
But this first point, although there is a real difference of opinion, can 
hardly explain the heat of the debate. What else can explain this? Richard 
33 Cf. Peter P. Nicholson, "The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics," Ethics 84 
(1974): 307-26, at p. 318: "Fuller's basic assumption, so basic that it is probably 
insufficiently emphasized, is that law per se is morally good." 
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Posner argues it has to be sought III "cultural differences" between the 
contestants. 
In Fuller's emphasis on the U.S. Constitution we have a clue that the debate between 
Hart and him - between an American and an Englishman - was as much cultural as 
intellectual. Since the United States has a judicially enforceable constitution that 
contains both open-ended provisions such as those guaranteeing equal protection and 
due process and a number of specific prohibitions and guarantees as well, while 
England has neither a written constitution nor a practice of judicial review of the 
validity of legislation, profoundly immoral laws are apt to be illegal in the United 
States and merely profoundly immoral in the United Kingdom. The overlap between 
law and morality is different in the two countries. 34 
But the problem is that Fuller is so "British."35 Nowhere do we find Fuller 
stressing the significance of a written charter of rights, to be enforced by 
judicial power, as we find this with the ideologues of "American constitu-
tionalism."36 Even Fuller's reference to Coke, by many commentators 
lauded as the precursor of judicial review,37 does not emphasize what we 
now see as the adoption of American principles.38 Both Hart and Fuller 
seem to bet on ordinary law that conforms to the principles of law (or 
"legality," in Hart's phrasing).39 
34 Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence, p. 230. 
35 Cf. for a good comparison between the British and the American traditions: Alan Ryan, 
"The British, the Americans, and Rights," in A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in 
Philosophy, Politics, and Law - 1791 and 1991, ed. Michael J. Lacey and Knud Haak-
onssen, (Cambridge [etc.J: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars/Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991), pp. 366-440. 
36 Cf. Fuller's relatively reserved treatment of typically American institutions like civil 
rights and judicial review (e.g. Lon L. Fuller, "La Philosophie du droit aux Etats-Unis," 
Les Etudes philosophiques 12 (1964): 559-68) with Dworkin's abounding enthusiasm in 
Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990). 
37 Cf. Theodore F.T. Plucknett, "Bonham's Case and Judicial Review," Harvard Law 
Review 40 (1926-1927): 30-70; Roscoe Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," Harvard 
Law Review XXI (1908): 383-407, at p. 390. 
38 In commenting on the work of Coke, Fuller writes: "Those who actually created our 
republic and its Constitution were much closer in their thinking to the age of Coke than 
they are to ours. They, too, were concerned to avoid repugnancies in their institutions 
and to see to it that those institutions should suit the nature of man." (ML, p. 101) 
39 In Hart's case this is not very surprising. It goes back to a long tradition of Bentham 
and Dicey. Cf. J. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 
Bowring ed. (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843); also in Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, 
Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man, ed. Jeremy Waldron (LondonlNew York: 
Methuen, 1987), pp. 46-69; A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the Constitution, lOth 
ed., with an introduction by E.C.S. Wade (London: Macmillan Education, [1885]1987). 
For Hart's attitude toward this tradition cf. H.L.A. Hart, "The United States of Ameri-
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Let us see how both writers struggle with this difficult issue, and how 
Hart makes far-reaching concessions to Fuller's perspective. Hart makes 
some interesting remarks when he treats the connection between law and 
morality in The Concept of Law. Hart is well aware, of course, that there 
is an impressive body of literature claiming a necessary connection be-
tween law and morals. Among the several claims that have been made in 
this respect, he also mentions an unidentified "critic of positivism," whose 
criticism is easily recognizable as Fuller's unease with the legal-positivist 
stance. "It may be said," Hart writes, "that the distinction between a good 
legal system which conforms at certain points to morality and justice, and 
a legal system which does not, is a fallacious one, because a minimum of 
justice is necessarily realized whenever human behaviour is controlled by 
general rules publicly announced and judicially applied."40 When the most 
odious laws are justly applied, we have, in the bare notion of a general 
rule of law, the germ at least of justice.41 And if these rules fulfil their 
function, social control, the laws have to satisfY certain conditions: they 
must be intelligible and within the capacity of most to obey, and in general 
they must not be retrospective, though exceptionally they may be. "Plainly 
these features of control by rule are closely related to the requirements of 
justice which lawyers term principles of legality," Hart writes, and he 
continues: 
Indeed one critic of positivism has seen in these aspects of control by rules, something 
amounting to a necessary connection between law and morality, and suggested that 
they be called "the inner morality of law." Again, if this is what the necessary connec-
tion of law and morality means, we may accept it. It is unfortunately compatible with 
t ·· ·t 42 very grea Imqm y. 
For the moment I will not comment on the question if, and if so, to what 
extent, "iniquity" would be compatible with compliance with the morality 
of law. Let us concentrate on what precedes: "If this is what the necessary 
connection of law and morality means, we may accept it," Hart writes. 
Now, this is the connection of law and morality that Fuller wants to 
emphasize. So what is left of the difference of opinion? Is there any 
difference of opinion at all? Some commentators have, for reasons under-
standable by'now, denied the differences of opinion. "There is much in the 
ca," in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 53-78. 
40 Hart, Concept of Law , p. 202. 
41 Hart, Concept of Law, p. 202. 
42 Hart, Concept of Law, p. 202. 
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above that a positivist of Hart's variety can agree with," says Golding after 
a resume of Fuller's theory.43 Judith Shklar is even more adamant in her 
emphasis on congruence and tells us: "Whatever their disagreements, both 
sides agree that justice is a matter of the equal application of rules."44 
Fuller insists that some values are immanent in the law as such and that 
law is not law unless they are present, Shklar writes. But this "defini-
tional self-insurance"45 of Fuller (that Hart apparently lacks) is considered 
relatively unimportant by this commentator. 
When both Hart and Fuller subscribe to the position that the principles 
of legality are important, where is the difference?46 Perhaps in that the 
two authors have different expectations of what a "utopia of legality" 
implies for justice? But neither Hart nor Fuller is very clear about what 
they expect from compliance to legality. Both Hart and Fuller seem to 
accept the principles of legality as necessary conditions for "good law" (or 
"law," in Fuller's case). But neither considers them to be sufficient condi-
tions. 
3.3 How much iniquity is possible when the morality of law is respected? 
Although both thinkers agree that iniquity is possible when the eight 
principles are respected, there seems to be a difference of opinion about 
the extent of iniquity that is possible, and the likelihood that this will 
occur. Hart writes that the inner morality of law is compatible with "very 
great iniquity" (emphasis added). 
Commenting on this passage Fuller writes that "one could not wish for 
a more explicit denial of any possible interaction between the internal and 
external moralities of law than that contained in this last sentence.,,47 
Perhaps these words are somewhat exaggerated so long as Hart has not 
43 Golding, Philosophy of Law, p. 48. 
44 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge, Mass.! 
London: Harvard University Press, [1964]1986), p. 109. 
45 Shklar, Legalism, p. 108. 
46 Not only Hart, but also other critics of Fuller subscribed to the importance of the eight 
principles. This also pertains to all the members of the "New Analytical Jurists" (a 
supposedly new school oflegal philosophy, comprising Hart, Dworkin, Marshall Cohen, 
and Summers). Cohen sees Fuller's "canons" as a "tolerable start at producing a set of 
conditions necessary for the presence of a (modern) legal system." Dworkin accepts 
"Fuller's conclusion that some degree of compliance with his eight canons of law is 
necessary to produce (or equally important, to apply) any law, even bad law." Also, 
Summers contends that "if we are to have law at all," we must have some compliance 
with the principles oflegality. Cf. R. Summers, "The New Analytical Jurists," New York 
University Law Review 41 (1966): 861-96 and Fuller's commentary in ML, p. 197. 
47 ML, p. 154. 
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clarified what he exactly means. Hart's concession on the part of an 
internal connection between law and morality seems clear, but Fuller is 
fastidious. 
Does Hart mean merely that it is possible, by stretching the imagination, to conceive 
the case of an evil monarch who pursues the most iniquitous ends but at all times 
preserves a genuine respect for the principles of legality? If so, the observation seems 
out of place in a book that aims at bringing "the concept oflaw" into closer relation with 
life. Does Hart mean to assert that history does in fact afford significant examples of 
regimes that have combined a faithful adherence to the internal morality of law with a 
brutal indifference to justice and human welfare? If so, one would have been grateful 
for examples about which some meaningful discussion might turn.48 
These are relevant questions. But Fuller makes no effort to answer them. 
He criticizes Hart for his "no more than casual and passing consideration" 
that the problems of legality deserve. But what kind of utopia we can 
expect when the principles of legality are honored Fuller does not exem-
plify. He asks for "examples about which some meaningful discussion 
might turn." 
Later participants in the debate have furnished some material. Fried-
mann sets the tone: "The Nazi system, at the height of its effectiveness, 
complied with all the eight requirements, except, to some extent, that of 
promulgation," he writes. 49 And he continues: 
The Nazi extermination decrees, for example, whose "orderly" and systematic brutality 
has more than anything else inspired the many postwar discussions on the invalidity of 
the Nazi legal system as incompatible with basic principles of humanity - were 
certainly general, insofar as they applied to a tragically large but clearly definable class 
of victims; they were made known to them with cynical brutality; they were prospective, 
clear, and free from contradictions; and they were, unfortunately, far from being 
impossible of execution. Nor was there any lack of congrnence between the law and 
official action, because the exterminations took place within a hierarchic structure 
derived from the supreme legislative authority of the Fuehrer. 5o 
This is a radical statement. But Friedmann's stance is not rare. Dias 
agrees with Hart (and Friedmann) that Fuller's eight "desiderata" are 
compatible with very great iniquity. He refers to Herod's order for the 
massacre of innocent children as an example that satisfied all the condi-
tions.51 Bix asks whether there are regimes, generally condemned as evil, 
48 ML, p. 154. 
49 W. Friedmann, Legal Theory, 5th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1967), p. 19. 
50 Friedmann, Legal Theory, p. 19. 
51 RW.M. Dias, Jurisprudence, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1985), p. 493. 
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which have at times at least been quite meticulous about legal procedures, 
and as an answer to this question he refers to South Mrica and East 
Germany as examples. 52 Wacks tells us that compliance with Fuller's 
"internal morality" is no guarantee of a just order. The South Mrican legal 
system probably satisfies all eight principles, he tells US. 53 Even Sim-
monds, Fuller's most sympathetic commentator among modern legal 
philosophers, contends that compliance with the eight principles does not 
guarantee that the law will be just. However, both Simmonds and Bix 
make relevant restrictions. The fact that there are no guarantees does not 
demonstrate that the rule of law is not a genuine moral value, Simmonds 
writes. "The fact is that compliance with the eight principles is logically 
consistent with the pursuit of evil aims in very much the same way that 
armed robbery is logically consistent with a scrupulous concern for paying 
one's debts. They are indeed logically consistent, but they are very un-
likely to be found together."s4 Bix writes that, although it is probably 
claiming too much for those principles to say that following them would 
guarantee a substantively just system, following the principles of legality 
is itself a moral good, because following the principles of legality may 
"hinder base actions.,,55 
Two observations seem to give cause for further thought. First, Sim-
monds's remark that they are "very unlikely to be found together." And 
second, something that none of the participants in the discussion has 
revealed but which seems relevant: None of the regimes mentioned by 
Fuller's critics is in existence any longer. East Germany, Nazi Germany, 
South Mrica - they have all crumbled down. Is this a mere coincidence? 
Or is it significant? Perhaps we should understand Fuller's thesis as 
saying that no regime violating the principles of the morality of law can 
contiiwe to exist. 
This is, indeed, how some commentators have understood Fuller's 
claims. Dias is well aware, for instance, that Fuller seems to think "that 
iniquitous regimes have not continued to exist, nor could they continue to 
combine evil policies with fidelity to the 'internal morality.",56 Also Fried-
mann, a relentless critic of Fuller and admirer of Hart, states that "no 
totalitarian legal order could survive for any length of time if all or a great 
majority of its laws were made retroactive; legal order would break down 
52 Bix, Jurisprudence, p. 84. 
53 Wacks, Jurisprudence, p. 73. 
54 Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence, p. 123. 
55 Bix, Jurisprudence, p. 84. 
56 Dias, Jurisprudence, p. 493 (emphasis added). 
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in confusion."57 Martin, finally, writes: "At best, Fuller's thesis would only 
show that in the long run a system of law in which decisions are justified 
and explained could have no evil laws. But, as Lord Keynes once re-
marked, in the long run we'll all be dead. ,,58 
The reference to Keynes and the words "at best" make clear that 
Martin thinks the "discovery" that evil regimes are in the long run incom-
patible with respect for the morality oflaw, is a trivial insight. But this is 
unjustified, so it seems to me. It is rather puzzling how Dias, Friedmann, 
Martin, and other commentators of Fuller can be so critical about the 
significance of the morality of law and at the same time confess that no 
legal order can continue to exist without compliance to those principles. If 
Fuller had really established that ''in the long run" a system with no 
respect for the morality of law is moribund, his contribution to the theory 
of law and government would have been considerable indeed. 
The last part of this essay is dedicated to the question why Fuller adhered 
to the morality of law as an ideal for legal systems. I think this can be 
explained by two factors. The first is that he was aware of the vicissitudes 
inherent in the more ambitious undertaking of developing a theory of 
substantive justice. The second is what could be called "Fuller's faith." 
4. Why Fuller made no attempt to develop a theory of substantive 
justice 
A good starting point of this section may be the following question: Why 
did Fuller never go on to making the step of developing a theory of sub-
stantive justice? If the morality of law is only a necessary reason for 
justice, why not develop a theory of "rights" as a superstructure comple-
menting the morality of law as the infrastructure of a theory of justice? 
The following reasons may be an explanation for this. We will first have 
to dwell a little on the rule of law as an ideal, because the principles of 
57 Friedmann, Legal Theory, p. 18. 
58 Michael Martin, The Legal Philosophy of H.L.A. Hart: A Critical Appraisal (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 1987), p. 222 (emphasis added). 
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law, taken together, constitute what is usually called "the rule of law."59 
Craig discerns two conceptions of the rule oflaw.60 
Formal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in which the 
law was promulgated (Was it done by a properly authorized person, in a 
properly authorized manner?, etc.); the clarity of the ensuing norm (Was it 
sufficiently clear to guide an individual's conduct so as to enable a person 
to plan his or hel" life?, etc.); and the temporal dimension of the enacted 
norm (Was it prospective or retrospective?, etc.).61 Typical of the formal 
concept of the rule of law is that no judgment upon the actual content of 
the law itself is passed; the question is whether the formal precepts of the 
rule of law were met. 
Substantive conceptions of the rule of law seek to go beyond this. They 
stress the importance of certain rights that have to be complied with. If 
laws meet this standard, they are "good" laws; if not, they are "bad" laws, 
or, in some theories, not laws at all. 
As an example of the formal conception of the rule of law one may 
consider the approach taken by Joseph Raz62 and that taken by the great 
Victorian lawyer A.V. Dicey.63 The most outspoken contemporary sup-
porter of a substantive conception of the rule of law, however, is Ronald 
Dworkin. Central to Dworkin's concern is the question what rights people 
currently possess. It is a task of the court to assess this, according to the 
best theory of justice. 
Dworkin does not explicitly distinguish between these two conceptions 
of the rule of law. But what he calls the "rule book conception" is quite 
similar to the formal conception of the rule of law as discerned by Craig. 
The second conception of the rule of law is termed by Dworkin the "rights 
conception."64 He favors the second conception. This means that Dworkin 
59 Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence, p. 119: "It is easy to see that Fuller's eight 
principles correspond to the idea of 'the rule of law' (or at least to one aspect of that 
idea), long regarded as an important regulative ideal for Western legal systems." 
60 Paul Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework," Public Law 21 (1997): 467-87. 
61 Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions." 
62 J. Raz, "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue," Law Quarterly Review 93 (1977): 195-211 (also 
in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986, pp. 210-29). (Craig does not mention J. Raz, "The Politics of the Rule of 
Law," Ratio Juris 3 [1990]: 331-39, which to me seems more indicative of the substan-
tive conception ofthe rule onaw than the formal brand.) 
63 Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the Constitution. Cf. Craig, "Formal and Substantive 
Conceptions," p. 470. 
64 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass. [etc.]: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), p. 11. Cf. Craig, "Formal and Substantive. Conceptions," p. 477. 
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rejects a firm distinction between "legal" rules and a more complete 
political philosophy. For that very reason we find virtually no mention of 
the phrase "the rule oflaw" as such within his major work Law's Empire. 65 
On the whole, I think the analytical framework that Craig presents is 
fruitful, even though one does not have to agree with all his assertions. 
One of the most interesting questions for us is, of course, the position of 
Lon Fuller's work. It appears that he is hard to qualifY. Craig contends 
that most advocates of the formal conception of the rule of law, Raz for 
instance, are also leading exponents of legal positivism. The formal 
conception of the rule of law and the desire to keep legal questions sepa-
rate from broader issues of political theory in deciding what the content of 
the law actually is, fit naturally together, he writes.66 But we immediately 
realize that Fuller is an exception to this distinction. Fuller defends what 
Craig defines as a "formal conception," while at the same time he attacks 
legal positivism for its blindness toward values. 
How can we explain this? Should we conclude that, obviously, "Fuller's 
faith" is responsible for this? Does Fuller's faith in the formal aspects of 
the rule of law explain his reluctance to develop a theory of substantive 
justice, as his followers Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls and many others 
have indeed done? And can Fuller's hesitation be justified? 
5. The modesty of Fuller's claLm 
I think Fuller's claim is quite modest. His position may be summarized as 
follows: "I do not know exactly what justice is, but I have a clear idea 
about what it is not. There are some values we have to incorporate in 
every legal system. If we fail in this respect, justice fails and the system 
crumbles down." 
It seems that his critics want to hear from him that he defends a much 
bolder thesis. He must defend that the morality of law is the alpha and 
omega of justice; if not, his achievements are belittled as mere trivialities. 
A good example of this view of Fuller's achievements can be found in 
Martin's book on Hart. If we follow the advice given by Fuller, Martin· 
writes, "it does not follow from this that evil laws are impossible.,,67 Now, 
impossible is an ambitious claim. But what Fuller argued for is that there 
65 Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions," p. 478. 
66 Craig, "Formal and Substantive Conceptions," p. 477. 
67 Martin, Legal Philosophy of H.L.A.Hart, p. 221. 
116 Paul Cliteur 
must be some respect for the morality of law in order for a system to 
continue to exist. The examples of Nazi Germany, East Germany, and 
South Africa have only made this claim more probable in recent history. 
To be sure, "Fuller's faith" is no hard knowledge; it is what is characteris-
tic of faith. It is no illusion, but you have no hard assurance either. For 
faith some reasons can be adduced.6s I think Tertullianus' credo quia 
absurdum can hardly be called a faith. Faith seeks understanding, as 
Anselmus knew, but there are no hard proofs to make faith a "science." 
This is also the case with Fuller's faith. Fuller thinks that if judges are 
required to justify their decisions they will be "pulled" toward goodness. 
There are some reasons to think that this is true, and there are also some 
reasons to believe that this is a feasible strategy. One of the reasons why 
Fuller's minimalistic account of natural law seems so attractive is that his 
theory is invulnerable to attacks that more ambitious theories (e.g. Dwor-
kin's theory) fail to counter. 
6. Fuller's theory is not vulnerable because of "immoral morality" 
The previous sentences require some further explanation. One of the most 
impressive arguments against a substantive theory of the rule of law is 
the problem of "immoral morality." There are standards of "what ought to 
be" that can hardly be called moral, the argument runs. In a society 
devoted to evil ends, its principles of justice will also be tainted. 
"I take it that this is to be a warning addressed to those who wish 'to 
infuse more morality into the law,'" Fuller writes.69 And he continues by 
exposing what can be called "Fuller's faith," to wit, the relation between 
coherence and goodness. It may be justified, however, to dwell a little 
more on the question in what sense Fuller's theory is affected by this 
problem of the "immoral morality." As far as I can see, Fuller's theory is 
not affected by this argument at all. This has to do with his defense of 
what has been called the "formal conception of the rule of law." What 
characterizes Fuller's approach to the concept of law is that he favors a 
very minimalistic moral infusion; an infusion, moreover, with universal or 
semi-universal moral values that are not part of the specific cultural 
68 At least, according to some conceptions of faith. Cf. Paul Helm, Faith and Understand· 
ing (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997); Step hen T. Davis, God, Reason and 
Theistic Proofs (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997). 
69 PFL, p. 636. 
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inheritance of particular groupS.70 The problem of immoral morality is a 
genuine problem, but it is a problem that has to be dealt with by adher-
ents of the more substantive conceptions of the rule of law, like Ronald 
Dworkin. The concept of law as advocated by Dworkin not only contains 
the principles of legality but rights that have to "fit" into the specific legal 
culture where a problem of interpretation arises. Now, this may be a very 
evil legal culture. It may be a Nazi culture. But the morality of law, as 
outlined by Fuller, is not a set of principles that, in itself, gives reason for 
suspicion. It may not be enough for justice, but it would certainly not 
cause injustice. 
7. Fuller's faith fully stated: There is a relation between coherence 
and goodness 
Taken the modesty of Fuller's claim as a point of departure, the only thing 
Fuller is required to substantiate is that respect for the morality of law is 
likely to improve things in the sense of enhancing justice. It is against this 
background that we have to gauge Fuller's faith. Let us see whether this 
claim can be upheld. 
In a much-debated phrase Fuller writes: "I shall have to rest on the 
assertion of a belief that may seem naive, namely, that coherence and 
goodness have more affinity than coherence and evil."71 This is the boldest 
assertion of Fuller's faith. Many people think he overstated his faith in the 
principles oflaw.72 This declaration of faith was made in his 1958 article. 
The reformulation of his faith in The Morality of Law is more cautious. In 
1958 Fuller also believed that "when men are compelled to explain and 
justify their decisions, the effect will generally be to pull those decisions 
70 His principles of legality are valid for all systems of law, modern law, ancient law, law 
in general. In that sense the principles that make lawmaking possible are really 
natural-law-like. They are not different "at !Wme and at Athens, or different laws now 
and in the future," they are "for all nations and at all times," to paraphrase the famous 
characterization of natural law by Cicero, DeRepublica, b. Ill, XXII, 33. 
71 PFL, p. 636. 
72 Bix notes that there were times when Fuller overstated the importance of his "princi-
ples of legality." "When critics argued that a regime could follow those principles and 
still enact wicked laws, Fuller stated that he 'could not believe' that adherence to the 
internal requirements of law was as consistent with a bad legal system as they were 
with a good legal system." Bix speaks in this context also of Fuller's "faith." (Brian Bix, 
"Natural Law Theory," in A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, ed. 
Dennis Patterson, Cambridge, Mass. [etc.]: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 223-40, at p. 233) 
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toward goodness, by whatever standards of ultimate goodness there are.'>73 
This is a kind of faith, indeed. It is faith like the faith that is expressed in 
sayings such as: "In the clash of opinions truth will finally triumph"; "You 
can fool all the people some of the time and some of the people all the 
time, but you can't fool all the people all the time.,,74 
Let us examine more closely the statement that coherence and good-
ness have more affinity than coherence and evil. I think this is likely to be 
true. It is for this very reason that it is easy to speak the truth and diffi-
cult to tell consistent lies all the time.75 But as far as the second formula-
tion of Fuller's faith is concerned, we have to discriminate between two 
parts of the sentence. The first is that when men are compelled to explain 
and justify their decisions, the effect will generally be to pull those deci-
sions toward goodness. We may ask: justification with reference to what 
standards? If these are the standards as specified in the morality oflaw, I 
think Fuller's faith is justified. It is more difficult to commit unjust deeds 
by means of general, promulgated, nonretroactive, clear, and noncontra-
dictory laws than by means of particular, secret, retroactive, and vague 
standards. Indeed, "it does not follow from this that evil laws are impossi-
ble,,,76 but they are less likely. 
However, Fuller states more in the second part of the phrase cited 
above. Fuller writes that "when men are compelled to explain and justify 
their decisions, the effect will generally be to pull those decisions toward 
goodness, by whatever standards of ultimate goodness there are.'>77 This 
claim goes further than the first. This sentence has puzzled many readers 
and a majority of them scorn the message conveyed as preposterous. 
Romantic, naive, optimistic - these are some of the more gentle qualifica-
tions that have been presented in comments on this part of Fuller's ideas. 
Before Fuller wrote them, Hart reflected on the idea that "what is utterly 
immoral cannot be law or lawful.,,78 He adduced two points of criticism. 
The first is that it will serve to cloak the true nature of the problems with 
73 PFL, p. 636. 
74 Abraham Lincoln cited in James Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. I (London: Mac-
Millan, 1921), p. 169. 
75 Cf. Richard Taylor, Restoring Pride: The Lost Virtue of Our Age (Buffalo, N.Y.: Pro-
metheus Books, 1996), p. 100: "Truth has a simple but important property that is 
insufficiently appreciated by persons driven more by vanity and conceit than by genuine 
pride. It is expressed by saying that all truth is consistent with itself, while even the 
smallest untruth is at odds with everything." 
76 Martin, Legal Philosophy of H.L.A. Hart, p. 222. 
77 PFL, p. 636 (emphasis added). 
78 Hart, "Positivism," p. 77. 
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which we are faced. This is the well-known argument, first advanced by 
Bentham and Austin, that the separation of law and morals "will enable 
men to see steadily the precise issues posed by the existence of morally 
bad laws."79 This point has been much debated in the literature on the 
separation of law and morals, and I will leave it untouched here. I would 
like to dwell on another part of the discussion, to wit, that Fuller's ap-
proach would "encourage the romantic optimism that all the values we 
cherish ultimately will fit into a single system, that not one of them has to 
be sacrificed or compromised to accommodate another."so In this context, 
Hart quotes the lines: "All Discord Harmony not understood/All Partial 
Evil Universal Good." Without further commentary Hart writes: "This is 
surely untrue." 
This passage is very relevant in the context of the Fuller-Hart debate. 
Hart seems to think that it is "romantic" to hold that the values we 
cherish will fit into a single system. The question whether this is true, is 
dependent on the question what we understand by "romantic" and "roman-
ticism." Taken in the sense of a cultural movement, the idea characterized 
is certainly not "romantic";81 optimistic it may be. Hart seems to reject 
such optimism, and as an argument for this, he seems to paraphrase some 
lines that could have been extracted from the work of Isaiah Berlin, who 
was always combating what he called "monism."82 The lines by Pope 
(whose name is not revealed) are appropriate here, because he is a para-
digm of the classical thinker, indeed, who advocated that the values we 
79 Hart, "Positivism," p. 53. 
80 Hart, "Positivism," p. 77. 
81 ef. H.G. Schenk, The Mind of the European Romantics: An Essay in Cultural History 
(Oxford [etc.]: Oxford University Press, 1979); Hugh Honour, Romanticism (New York 
[etc.]: Harper & Row, 1979); Kenneth Clark, The Romantic Rebellion: Romantic versus 
Classic Art (London: John Murray/Sotheby, 1973). 
82 Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," inaugural lecture Oxford University (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1958; also in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford [etc.]: 
Oxford University Press, [1969] 197.5, pp. 118-72). At p. 167 Berlin speaks of an 
"ancient faith" whieh rests on "the conviction that all the positive values in which men 
have believed must, in the end, be compatible, and perhaps even entail one another" 
and "that all good things are compatible." Berlin rejects this faith. He even asserts it is 
responsible "for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals." 
Berlin was Hart's "closest friend among his philosophical colleagues" and he informed 
Hart about the developments in modern philosophy (ef. Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, 
London: Edward Arnold, 1981, p. 11). 
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cherish will ultimately fit into a single system.83 But Hart does not make 
the slightest effort to explain why this is "surely untrue,"S4 and Berlin, 
pace all his rhetorical brilliance, has not made this clear either. Pope was 
not the only one, of course, who thought this. Classical rationalism, the 
tradition that Berlin rejected, and by implication Hart rejects, had a 
considerable influence on Western thinking (an "ancient faith," Berlin 
writes) and seems to have influenced Lon Fuller as well.85 Fuller himself 
made this clear when he referred to his sources of inspiration for the 
morality of aspiration. "The morality of aspiration is most plainly exempli-
fied in Greek philosophy," he writes. "It is the morality of the Good Life, of 
excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers."S6 I think it is not 
unfair to say that much of Hart's inability to understand some of the 
claims made by Fuller are explained by his incapacity to understand the 
central ideas of Greek philosophy, mainly Greek ethics. 
8. The essence of Greek ethics according to Richard Taylor 
The best exposition of Greek ethics seems to me the work of the American 
philosopher Richard Taylor.87 Taylor is known in circles of legal philoso-
phers for his elaboration of the central tenets of American realism. BB But 
83 The poem continues (and closes) with: "And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, One 
truth is clear, Whatever is, is right." (An Essay on Man, cited in A Book of English 
Poetry, ed. G.B. Harrison, Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1937]1978, p. 188) 
84 Hart, "Positivism," p. 77. 
85 Cf. also Robert S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller (London: Edward Arnold, 1984), p. 76: 
"Fuller singled out John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century and Sir Isaiah Berlin in 
our own time as social theorists whose views illustrate many of the emphases and 
tendencies to which he objected. Unlike Berlin, Fuller refused to separate means and 
ends, insisting that they form a continuum." 
86 ML, p. 5. 
87 Other works that are helpful here are: W.T. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philoso-
phy (LondonlNew York: MacMillan, [1920] 1960) and Paul Elmer More, Hellenistic 
Philosophies, Volume II, The Greek Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1923). 
88 Cf. Theodore M. Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle: Problems of Legal Philosophy 
(Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), p. 13: "Perhaps the most extreme realist 
view of law is that expressed by such writers as Jerome .Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and 
Richard Taylor." The main ideas of Taylor in this respect are to be found in: Richard 
Taylor, "Law and Morality," New York University Law Review 43 (1968): 611-50. 
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his more philosophical work89 is interesting for the Fuller-Hart debate 
because he widely commented on the Greek conception of morality as a 
morality of excellence, a conception that not only influenced Fuller's ideas 
on the morality of aspiration, but also pervaded his other opinions, his 
"faith" about coherence and goodness in particular. 
What Hart rejected as "surely untrue" is also repudiated by Taylor. But 
the difference between Hart and Taylor is that Taylor, after a meticulous 
analysis of Greek ethics, understands what the Greeks were doing. Hart 
has no idea of another conception of ethics than modern ethics, and so he 
rejects the classical ideas as "romantic" without understanding them.90 
Essential for the Greek conception of ethics is the - for us, moderns, at 
least - mysterious91 identification of virtue and knowledge. 
Characteristic of Greek ethics, mainly the classical conception of ethics 
as has been expounded by Socrates, is that wrongdoing is always involun-
tary, and the product of ignorance. Men who bring about bad ends are 
acting from ignorance; they quite literally do not know any better. To 
explain this conviction that, again, is so hard to understand for modern 
man, Taylor presents an analogy. Suppose a man is thirsty. He arrives at 
a well from which he is perfectly free to drink. He will want, then, to drink 
from that well, for this will certainly appear to him as good. But all this is 
consistent with the supposition that the well is in fact, and unbeknown to 
him, poisoned. If, then, he does drink from it, he will be doing what he 
wants to do (drink from that well), thereby seeking to realize a certain 
good. From the perspective of a fuller knowledge of what he is doing, 
however, he is not doing what he wants to do at all. For what he wants is 
to drink, not to drink poison. This means that he drinks from the well out 
of ignorance, not really knowing what he is doing.92 
This analogy is important, because Socrates - based on a theory as 
expounded above - thought that all injustice, and all voluntary behavior 
whose consequences are on the whole bad, is to be interpreted in such 
terms. Injustice is always the result when people do things not fully 
89 Richard Taylor, Goo.d and Evil (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1984); Restoring 
Pride: The Lost Virtue of Our Age (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1996); Reflective 
Wisdom (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1989); and, especially, Ethics, Faith, and 
Reason (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985). 
90 William J. Prior, Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics 
(LondonINew York: Routledge, 1991) may also be helpful. 
91 Cf. Martin, Legal Philosophy of H.L.A. Hart, p. 222: "Why Fuller thinks that this 
justification and explanation would tend to improve matters is a mystery." 
92 Taylor, Good and Evil, p. 54. 
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knowing what they do. If they did know, they would be deliberately 
choosing what is bad for them, which is an absurdity. 
This also applies to the dictator. If the dictator chooses what in fact 
turns out to be evil - namely, injustice - then he must be acting from 
ignorance. This is consistent with supposing that, from a more limited 
view, he gets what he wants - namely, self-aggrandizement - and that 
appears good to him. From a larger perspective, however, he gets what he 
does not want: a state of affairs that is loaded With evil. 93 
Let us now turn back to Fuller's intimations that "coherence and 
goodness have more affinity than coherence and evil."94 And let us recon-
sider Fuller's belief that when men are compelled to explain and justify 
their decisions, the effect will generally be to "pull those decisions toward 
goodness."95 From the Greek perspective these convictions are not only 
justified, but the contrary view, the view lauded by Berlin and by Hart as 
self-evident, would be considered absurd. Of course, all good things are 
coherent otherwise they would not be good. They may be considered good 
by people with limited understanding, but that does not make them good. 
This is also relevant to the question of justification. Of course, as the 
Socratic theory will state, the effect of a successful justification and 
explanation of decisions is that they will pull decisions toward goodness. 
Because evil decisions cannot be adequately explained, they cannot be 
satisfactorily justified. 
Perhaps somewhat confusing for Fuller's rationalism is the fact that he 
refers not only to Greek ethics, but also to the more dynamic kind of 
rationalism that is associated with Hegel's philosophy. "According to these 
beliefs," Fuller writes in "Positivism and Fidelity to Law," not mentioning 
any great historical predecessors, "I find a considerable incongruity in any 
conception that envisages a possible future in which the common law 
'works itself pure from case to case' toward a more perfect realization of 
iniquity."96 But, again, this is an argument within a certain tradition. We 
have to subscribe to the Hegelian "whatever is real is rational and what-
ever is rational is real.,,97 In law more "empirical" varieties of this kind of 
"dynamic rationalism" or "historicism" have been presented; for instance, 
93 Taylor, Good and Evil, p. 55. 
94 PFL, p. 636. 
95 PFL, p. 636. 
96 PFL, p. 636. 
97 Cf. also the end of Pope's poem cited above. 
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the theory as developed by the .Historical School98 or the "theory,,99 behind 
Burke's conservatism. But in all these varieties there are always the 
assumptions that Hart considered to be romantic and optimistic. Burke's 
"The individual is foolish, the species is wise," the idea of "historical 
reason" that is also to be found in the idea that the common law works 
itself pure/OD is another expression of faith that Hart would reject as 
romantic optimism. For the Benthamian H.L.A. Hart, the idea that the 
common law would "work itself pure from case to case" would be absurd, 
because common law is, in the famous characterization of Bentham, dog 
law.101 Bentham had faith in another tradition. He believed that a legisla-
ture chosen by the broadest possible electorate was the institution most 
likely to produce laws that served the public welfare. This would leave 
judges and commentators little discretion in their interpretation and 
application. 102 
So everybody has his own faith. I believe the faith as expounded in 
Fuller's work is certainly neither the most naive nor the least promising 
as far as the search for the principles of good government is concerned. 
98 Its most important American protagonist was: James Coolidge Carter, Law: Its 
Origin, Growth and Function (New York: G.P. Putnam's SonsILondon: Knicker-
bocker Press, 1907). Fuller gives a brief summary of his ideas in "La Philosophie du 
droit aux Etats-Unis," p. 564. 
99 Conservatives do not like the word "theory," nor do they favor "rationalism." They 
are both contrasted with "tradition." ef. Anthony Quintan, The Politics of Imperfec-
tion: The Religious and Secular Traditions of Conservative Thought in England from 
Hooker to Oakeshott (London/Boston: Faber and Faber, 1978). 
100 ef. also Teachout in this volume about Bickel's jurisprudential vision and the 
"common-law sensibility." 
101 Bentham: "When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he 
does it, and then beat him for it," cited in John Dinwiddy, Bentham (Oxford/New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 57. 
102 ef. Thomas C. Grey, "Advice for 'Judge and Company,'" The New York Review of 
Books, 12 March 1987: 32-35, at p. 32. 
